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currently implemented represents a step toward
what the theory of optimal monetary policy would
recommend. In the final section of the paper, I then
summarize some of the more important respects
in which an optimal policy regime would go beyond
current practice. Finally, as a concrete illustration
of some of the general remarks that have been made
about the form of an optimal policy rule, in an
appendix I briefly discuss the quantitative character
of optimal policy in the context of the small econo-
metric model for the United States presented in
Giannoni and Woodford (forthcoming).
1. ADVANTAGES OF AN EXPLICIT 
TARGET FOR MONETARY POLICY
Discussions of the desirability of inflation target-
ing for one country or another are often at cross
purposes because of differing implicit assumptions
about precisely what inflation targeting would mean.
It is thus perhaps useful to be clear from the outset
about what I regard to be the defining features of
the approach to the conduct of policy with which I
am concerned. Probably the most critical feature is
the existence of a publicly announced, quantitative
target that the central bank is committed to pursue,
the pursuit of which structures both policy delibera-
tions within the central bank and communications
with the public. As should become clear from the
discussion below, it is more important in my view
that there should be an explicit target for policy than
that it should be (in any strict sense) an inflation
target. In my view, the most distinctive and most
important achievement of the inflation-targeting
central banks has not been the reorientation of the
goals of monetary policy toward a stronger emphasis
on controlling inflation—this has occurred, but it
has been a worldwide trend over the past two
decades, neither limited to nor even necessarily
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ince the early 1990s, an increasing number
of countries have adopted explicit inflation
targets as the defining principle that should
guide the conduct of monetary policy. This devel-
opment is often credited with having brought about
substantial reductions in both the level and variabil-
ity of inflation in the inflation-targeting countries,
and is sometimes argued to have improved the
stability of the real economy as well.1
Inflation-forecast targeting, as a systematic deci-
sion procedure for the conduct of monetary policy,
was developed at central banks like the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of
England, and the Bank of Sweden on a trial-and-error
basis, with little guidance from the academic litera-
ture on monetary policy rules. But the growing popu-
larity of inflation targeting has more recently led to
an active literature that seeks to assess the desirabil-
ity of such an approach from the standpoint of theo-
retical monetary economics. This literature finds
that an optimal policy regime—one that could have
been designed on a priori grounds to achieve the
highest possible degree of social welfare—might
well be implemented through procedures that share
important features of the inflation-forecast targeting
that is currently practiced at central banks like those
just mentioned. At the same time, the normative
literature finds that one ought, in principle, to be
able to do better through appropriate refinement
of the practices developed at these banks.
Here I survey some of the most important con-
clusions of this literature. I shall begin by reviewing
some of the respects in which inflation targeting as
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1 For surveys of early experiences with inflation targeting, see Leiderman
and Svensson (1995) and Bernanke et al. (1999). King (forthcoming)
offers an optimistic assessment of the improvements made in the
conduct of monetary policy in the United Kingdom under inflation
targeting. For a more skeptical review of the lessons that can be gleaned
from experience to date, see Ball and Sheridan (forthcoming).
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most associated with the innovators in inflation
targeting, and has hardly required a fundamental
change in the traditional concerns of central
bankers—but rather the development of an approach
to the conduct of policy that focuses on a clearly
defined target, that assigns an important role to
quantitative projections of the economy’s future
evolution in policy decisions, and that is committed
to a high degree of transparency as to the goals of
policy, the decisions that are made, and the principles
that guide those decisions.
It is useful to begin by discussing why it is desir-
able for a central bank to commit itself to an explicit
target as the goal of its policy. The proposal that
banks should do so runs contrary to a common
instinct of central bankers, according to which it is
wise to say as little as possible in advance about what
one may do in the future. Because central banking
is a complex task, the argument goes, any explicit
target or policy rule would prove to be a straight-
jacket, preventing the full exercise of the judgment
of central bankers on behalf of society when unan-
ticipated circumstances arise, as they invariably do.
Furthermore, even if a formula could be developed
that would adequately describe what a good central
banker should do, announcing it publicly would only
invite second-guessing by the public and politicians
of policy decisions that are best left in the hands of
professionals. The best approach, then, is to delegate
the task to the best possible people, grant them full
discretion, and require as little public comment as
possible on the way they practice their arcane art.
But while it is true that central banking is com-
plex, reasoning of this kind misses a fundamental
point about the kind of problem that a central bank
is called upon to solve. Central banking is not like
steering an oil tanker, or even guiding a spacecraft,
that follows a trajectory that depends on constantly
changing factors, but that does not depend on the
vehicle’s own expectations about where it is heading.
Because the key decisionmakers in an economy
are forward-looking, central banks affect the econ-
omy as much through their influence on expectations
as through any direct, mechanical effects of central
bank trading in the market for overnight cash. As a
consequence, there is good reason for a central bank
to commit itself to a systematic approach to policy
that not only provides an explicit framework for
decisionmaking within the bank, but that is also
used to explain the bank’s decisions to the public.
1.1 Central Banking as Management of
Expectations
One important advantage of commitment to an
appropriately chosen policy rule is that it facilitates
public understanding of policy. It is important for
the public to understand the central bank’s actions,
to the greatest extent possible, not only for reasons
of democratic legitimacy—though this is an excellent
reason itself, given that central bankers are granted
substantial autonomy in the execution of their task—
but also in order for monetary policy to be most
effective. For not only do expectations about policy
matter, but, at least under current conditions, very
little else matters. Few central banks of major indus-
trial nations still make much use of credit controls
or other attempts to directly regulate the flow of
funds through financial markets and institutions.
Increases in the sophistication of the financial system
have made it more difficult for such controls to be
effective, and in any event the goal of improvement
of the efficiency of the sectoral allocation of resources
stressed above would hardly be served by such
controls, which (if successful) inevitably create
inefficient distortions in the relative cost of funds
to different parts of the economy.
Instead, central banks restrict themselves to
interventions that seek to control the overnight
interest rate in an interbank market for central bank
balances (for example, the federal funds rate in the
United States). But the current level of overnight
interest rates as such is of negligible importance
for economic decisionmaking; if a change in the
overnight rate were thought to imply only a change
in the cost of overnight borrowing for that one night,
then even a large change (say, a full percentage
point increase) would make little difference to
anyone’s spending decisions. The effectiveness of
changes in central bank targets for overnight rates
in affecting spending decisions (and hence ulti-
mately pricing and employment decisions) is wholly
dependent upon the impact of such actions upon
other financial-market prices, such as longer-term
interest rates, equity prices, and exchange rates.
These are plausibly linked, through arbitrage rela-
tions, to the short-term interest rates most directly
affected by central-bank actions; but it is the
expected future path of short-term rates over com-
ing months and even years that should matter for
the determination of these other asset prices, rather
than the current level of short-term rates by itself.
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Thus the ability of central banks to influence
expenditure, and hence pricing, decisions is critically
dependent upon their ability to influence market
expectations regarding the future path of overnight
interest rates and not merely their current level.
Better information on the part of market participants
about central bank actions and intentions should
increase the degree to which central bank policy
decisions can actually affect these expectations, and
so increase the effectiveness of monetary stabiliza-
tion policy. Insofar as the significance of current
developments for future policy are clear to the private
sector, markets can to a large extent “do the central
bank’s work for it,” in that the actual changes in
overnight rates required to achieve the desired
changes in incentives can be much more modest
when expected future rates move as well.2
The importance of being able to influence expec-
tations about future policy through means other
than the announcement of a new operating target
for the overnight interest rate becomes especially
clear when the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates prevents further interest-rate cuts, in an envi-
ronment where aggregate nominal expenditure is
nonetheless too low. This is the situation that Japan
has faced for more than four years now, and recently
there has been considerable discussion in the United
States as well as to whether the Fed is not nearly
“out of ammunition” with which to fight a possible
threat of deflation. The key to avoiding deflation and
economic contraction under such circumstances,
as Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show, is to be
able to credibly commit to looser monetary policy
in the future.3 This requires explicit discussion of
the way in which policy will be conducted in the
future; furthermore, Eggertsson and Woodford show
that the kind of commitment that is needed can be
best expressed in terms of a commitment to a form
of price-level target, which the central bank is com-
mitted to eventually hitting, even if the zero bound
requires the target to be undershot for some period
of time. While one might alternatively imagine a
direct commitment regarding the length of time for
which interest rates will remain low, the optimal
continuation time will depend on how real condi-
tions in the economy develop (that cannot yet be
perfectly foreseen); it is thus easier to explain the
kind of commitment that is actually appropriate by
explaining the target that will have to be met in order
for the zero interest-rate policy to be abandoned.
The existence of an explicit target for policy has
similar advantages under more ordinary circum-
stances as well. An obvious consequence of the
importance of managing expectations is that a
transparent central-bank decisionmaking process
is highly desirable. This has come to be widely
accepted by central bankers over the past decade.
(See Blinder et al., 2001, for a detailed and authori-
tative discussion.) But it is sometimes supposed that
the most crucial issues are ones such as the fre-
quency of press releases or the promptness and
detail with which the minutes of policy deliberations
are published. Instead, from the perspective sug-
gested here, what is important is not so much that
the central bank’s deliberations themselves be public,
as that the bank give clear signals about what the
public should expect it to do in the future. The public
needs to have as clear as possible an understanding
of the rule that the central bank follows in deciding
what it does. Inevitably, the best way to communicate
about this will be by offering the public an explana-
tion of the decisions that have already been made;
the bank itself would probably not be able to describe
how it might act in all conceivable circumstances,
most of which will never arise.
The Inflation Reports of the leading inflation-
targeting central banks provide good practical
examples of communication with the public about
the central bank’s policy commitments. These
reports do not pretend to give a blow-by-blow
account of the deliberations by which the central
bank reached the position that it has determined to
matters, so that open market operations while in the trap are effective
only to the extent that they are understood as implying a commitment
to a higher money supply after the zero bound ceases to bind.
2 There is evidence that this is already happening, as a result of both
greater sophistication on the part of financial markets and greater
transparency on the part of central banks, the two developing in a sort
of symbiosis with one another. Blinder et al. (2001, p. 8) argue that,
from early 1996 through mid-1999, one could observe the U.S. bond
market moving in response to macroeconomic developments that
helped to stabilize the economy, despite relatively little change in the
level of the federal funds rate; furthermore, they suggest that this
reflected an improvement in the bond market’s ability to forecast Fed
actions before they occur. Statistical evidence of increased forecast-
ability of Fed policy by the markets is provided by Lange, Sack, and
Whitesell (2001), who show that the ability of Treasury bill yields to
predict changes in the federal funds rate some months in advance
has increased since the late 1980s.
3 The basic point about the importance of commitment regarding future
policy was first made by Krugman (1998); Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) present a fully dynamic analysis and characterize the optimal
policy commitment in an optimizing model with staggered price-
setting. The conclusion obtained by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003) is
not fundamentally different: In their analysis, it is actually only the
expected money supply at the time of exit from the liquidity trap that 
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announce; but they do explain the analysis that
justifies the position that has been reached. This
analysis provides information about the bank’s
systematic approach to policy by illustrating its
application to the concrete circumstances that have
arisen since the last report; and it provides informa-
tion about how conditions are likely to develop in
the future through explicit discussion of the bank’s
own projections. Because the analysis is made public,
it can be expected to shape future deliberations; the
bank knows that it should be expected to explain
why views expressed in the past are not later being
followed. Thus a commitment to transparency of
this sort helps to make policy more fully rule-based,
as well as increasing the public’s understanding of
the rule.
It might be argued that it should be enough for
a central bank to follow a systematic rule in its con-
duct of policy, without also needing to explain it to
the public. If one assumes rational expectations on
the part of the public, it would follow that the system-
atic pattern in the way that policy is conducted
should be correctly inferred from the bank’s observed
behavior. Yet while it would be unwise to choose a
policy whose success depends on its not being
understood by the public—which is the reason for
choosing a policy rule that is associated with a
desirable rational expectations equilibrium—it is
at the same time prudent not to rely too heavily on
the assumption that the public will understand policy
perfectly regardless of the efforts that are made to
explain it. Insofar as explanation of the policy rule
to the public does no harm under the assumption
of rational expectations, but improves outcomes
under the (more realistic) assumption that a correct
understanding of the central bank’s policy commit-
ments does not occur automatically, then it is clearly
desirable for the central bank to explain the rule
that it follows.
The advantages of a public target when the
private sector must otherwise forecast future policy
by extrapolating from experience are shown in a
recent analysis by Orphanides and Williams (forth-
coming). In the Orphanides-Williams model, private
agents forecast inflation using a linear regression
model, the coefficients of which are constantly
reestimated using the most recent observations of
inflation. The assumption of forecasting in this man-
ner (on the basis of a finite time-window of historical
observations), rather than a postulate of rational
expectations, worsens the trade-off between inflation
variability and output-gap variability that is available
to the central bank. Allowing inflation variations in
response to “cost-push” shocks for the sake of output-
gap stabilization is more costly than it would be
under rational expectations, because temporary
inflation fluctuations in response to the shocks can
be misinterpreted as indicating different inflation
objectives on the part of the central bank. Orphanides
and Williams then show that a credible commitment
to a long-run inflation target—so that private agents
do not need to estimate the long-run average rate of
inflation, but only the dynamics of transitory depar-
tures from it—allows substantially better stabilization
outcomes, though still not quite as good as if private
agents were to fully understand the equilibrium
dynamics implied by the central bank’s policy rule.
This provides a nice example of theoretical support
for the interpretation given by Mervyn King (forth-
coming) and others of practical experience with
inflation targeting, which is that tighter anchoring
of the public’s inflation expectations has made possi-
ble greater stability of both real activity and inflation.
1.2 Avoiding the Pitfalls of Discretionary
Policy
There is also a further, somewhat subtler, reason
why explicit commitment to a target or policy rule
is desirable, given the forward-looking behavior of
the people in the economy that one seeks to stabilize.
It is not enough that a central bank have sound
objectives (reflecting a correct analysis of social
welfare); that it make policy in a systematic way,
using a correct model of the economy and a staff
that is well-trained in numerical optimization; and
that all this be explained thoroughly to the public.
A bank that approaches its problem as one of opti-
mization under discretion—deciding afresh on the
best action in each decision cycle, with no commit-
ment regarding future actions except that they will
be the ones that seem best in whatever circumstances
may arise—may obtain a substantially worse out-
come, from the point of view of its own objectives,
than a bank that commits itself to follow a properly
chosen policy rule. As Kydland and Prescott (1977)
first showed, this can occur even when the central
bank has a correct quantitative model of the policy
trade-offs that it faces at each point in time, and the
private sector has correct expectations about the
way that policy will be conducted.
At first thought, discretionary optimization might
seem exactly what one would want an enlightened
central bank to do. All sorts of unexpected events
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constantly occur that affect the determination of
inflation and real activity, and it is not hard to see
that, in general, the optimal level of interest rates
at any point in time should depend on precisely
what has occurred. It is plainly easiest, as a practical
matter, to arrange for such complex state-dependence
of policy by having the instrument setting at a given
point in time be determined only after the unex-
pected shocks have already been observed. Further-
more, it might seem that the dynamic programming
approach to the solution of intertemporal optimiza-
tion problems provides justification for an approach
in which a planning problem is reduced to a series
of independent choices at each of a succession of
decision dates.
But standard dynamic programming methods
are valid only for the optimal control of a system
that evolves mechanically in response to the current
action of the controller. The problem of monetary
stabilization policy is of a different sort, in that the
consequences of the central bank’s actions depend
not only upon the sequence of instrument settings
up until the present time, but also upon private-
sector expectations regarding future policy. In such
a case, sequential (discretionary) optimization leads
to a suboptimal outcome because, at each decision
point, prior expectations are taken as given, rather
than as something that can be affected by policy.
Nonetheless, the predictable character of the central
bank’s decisions, taken from this point of view, do
determine the (endogenous) expectations of the
private sector at earlier dates, under the hypothesis
of rational expectations: A commitment to behave
differently, that is made credible to the private sector,
could shape those expectations in a different way;
and because expectations matter for the determina-
tion of the variables that the central bank cares
about, in general, outcomes can be improved
through shrewd use of this opportunity.
The best-known example of a distortion created
by discretionary optimization is the “inflation bias”
analyzed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (1983). In the presence of a short-run
“Phillips curve” trade-off between inflation and real
activity (given inflation expectations) and a target
level of real activity higher than the one associated
with an optimal inflation rate (in the case of inflation
expectations also consistent with that optimal rate),
these authors showed that discretionary optimiza-
tion leads to a rate of inflation that is inefficiently
high on average, owing to neglect of the way that
pursuit of such a policy raises inflation expectations
(causing an adverse shift of the short-run Phillips
curve). A commitment to an inflation target is one
obvious way of eliminating the temptation of sub-
optimal behavior of this particular kind.
However, many central bankers would argue
that they have absorbed the lesson of the Kydland-
Prescott and Barro-Gordon models and are able to
avoid systematically higher inflation than is desir-
able, without any need for advance commitments
regarding future policy. For example, they may view
themselves as using their discretion to minimize a
loss function that differs from the ones assumed
by Kydland and Prescott or Barro and Gordon in a
way that eliminates the high predicted average rate
of inflation in the Markov equilibrium associated
with discretionary policy.
In response to this, it is important to note that
the distortions resulting from discretionary optimiza-
tion go beyond simple bias in the average levels 
of inflation or other endogenous variables; this
approach to the conduct of policy generally results
in suboptimal responses to shocks as well. For exam-
ple, various types of real disturbances can create
temporary fluctuations in what Wicksell called the
“natural rate of interest,” meaning that the level of
nominal interest rates required to stabilize both infla-
tion and the output gap varies over time (Woodford,
2003, Chap. 4). However, the amplitude of the
adjustment of short-term interest rates can be more
moderate—and still have the desired size of effect on
spending and hence on both output and inflation—
if it is made more persistent, so that when interest
rates are increased, they will not be expected to
quickly return to their normal level, even if the real
disturbance that originally justified the adjustment
has dissipated. Because aggregate demand depends
upon expected future short rates as well as current
short rates, a more persistent increase of smaller
amplitude can have an equal affect on spending. If
one also cares about reducing the volatility of short-
term interest rates, a more inertial interest-rate policy
of this kind will be preferable; that is, the anticipa-
tion that the central bank will follow such a policy
leads to a preferable rational-expectations equilib-
rium (Woodford, 1999a; 2003, Chap. 7). But a central
bank that optimizes under discretion has no incen-
tive to continue to maintain high interest rates
once the initial shock has dissipated; at this point,
prior demand has already responded to whatever
interest rate expectations were held then, and the
bank has no reason to take into account any effect




This distortion in the dynamic response of
interest rate policy to disturbances cannot be cured
by any adjustment of the way in which alternative
possible future paths for the economy are ranked
(assuming that the ranking depends only on the
future paths of inflation and other welfare-relevant
variables); instead, policy must be made history-
dependent, i.e., dependent upon past conditions even
when they are no longer relevant to the determina-
tion of the current and future evolution of the vari-
ables that the bank cares about. In general, no purely
forward-looking decision procedure—one that makes
the bank’s action at each decision point a function
solely of the set of possible paths for its target vari-
ables from that time onward—can bring about
optimal equilibrium responses to disturbances.
Discretionary optimization is an example of such a
procedure, and it continues to be when the bank’s
objective is modified, if the modified policy objective
still involves only the future values of the welfare-
relevant variables. A commitment to use policy to
achieve a pre-specified target, instead, can solve this
problem if the target is defined in a way that incor-
porates the proper history-dependence.4
The advantages of an explicit target in solving
this kind of problem are especially clear in the case
of a binding zero lower bound on interest rates, as
discussed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). When
the natural rate of interest is temporarily negative,
the zero bound may prevent stabilization of inflation
and the output gap at their desirable long-run average
levels, as such an equilibrium would require a tem-
porarily negative nominal interest rate. The key to
preventing an undesirably sharp deflation and econ-
omic contraction is to convince people that the price
level will eventually be raised, rather than being
stabilized at whatever level it may fall to in the period
during which the zero bound binds. A central bank
that is expected to optimize under discretion will not
be expected to subsequently undo the price decline
that occurs during the “liquidity trap” because the
absolute level of prices is not welfare-relevant; it will
therefore simply stabilize inflation and the output
gap once this again becomes possible, accepting
whatever level of prices happens to exist at that time.
A commitment in advance to the achievement of a
price level target—a target that is not allowed to shift
down even if actual prices undershoot it for many
quarters in a row, owing to the zero bound5—will
instead create expectations of the right sort. The
farther prices fall while the economy is in the “trap,”
the greater the expected future price increases will
be; and this automatic increase in expected inflation
will tend to prevent prices from falling very far, or
demand from contracting very much, in the first
place.
It is furthermore desirable not simply that a
central bank have a private intention of this sort,
but that it be publicly committed to such a target.
First, a public commitment is likely to make it easier
for the central bank’s policy deliberations to remain
focused on the right criterion—the criterion with the
property that systematic conformity to it leads to
an optimal equilibrium—rather than being tempted
to “let bygones be bygones.” And second, the benefits
associated with commitment to a history-dependent
policy depend entirely on this aspect of policy being
anticipated by the private sector; otherwise, it would
be rational to “let bygones be bygones.” There is no
point to a secret commitment to the future conduct
of policy in accordance with a history-dependent
rule while the private sector continues to believe
that the central bank will act in a purely forward-
looking fashion; thus the target should be explained
as clearly as possible to the public and shown to be
guiding the bank’s decisions.
1.3 Targeting Procedures as Policy Rules
It follows from the above discussion that there
are important advantages to a central bank’s com-
mitment to conduct policy in accordance with a
rule that can be explained to the public in advance.
I turn now to the advantages of the particular type
of rule that is followed by the inflation-targeting
central banks. This is a rule under which the central
bank’s commitment is defined by a target for certain
variables at a certain distance in the future, together
with a commitment to organize deliberations about
policy actions around the question of whether the
contemplated actions are consistent with the target.
Much of the theoretical discussion of “rules
versus discretion” since the seminal contribution
of Kydland and Prescott (1977) has supposed that
the conduct of policy in accordance with a “rule”
would mean something rather different from this.
5 As Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show, under an optimal policy
the price-level target would actually shift up in response to the target
misses during the period in which the zero bound is binding, and to a
greater extent the greater the target misses and the longer they persist.
4 The kind of modified inflation target that leads to optimal responses
to the kinds of fluctuations in the natural rate of interest described
above is derived in Giannoni and Woodford (forthcoming, Section 1.3).
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On the one hand, an important branch of the litera-
ture on policy rules has emphasized the importance
of limiting central bank discretion, in the sense of
any scope for the exercise of judgment as to the
nature of current conditions. A rule is then consid-
ered, by definition, to be a prescription of a fairly
mechanical type, the dictates of which are unambig-
uous; it cannot pretend to allow optimal responses
to all of the different types of shocks that an econ-
omy may face, and indeed it is often asserted that
adherence to a rule means abandoning any concern
for the stabilization of real variables. Inflation fore-
cast targeting as actually practiced is nowhere as
rigid a framework as this; in particular, projections
of the economy’s future evolution under alternative
possible actions play a central role in policy delibera-
tions, and these projections, even when disciplined
by the use of a quantitative model, allow a rich range
of information about current conditions to be taken
into account in a way that could not be easily speci-
fied in advance by a computer program.
Alternatively, another branch of the literature
identifies “commitment” with a once-and-for-all
choice (at some initial date) of an optimal state-
contingent plan for the central bank, which is imple-
mented afterward by simply observing the state of
the world each period and executing the instrument
setting called for at that date and in that state. Under
the conception of rule-based policy in this literature,
the central bank may in principle pay attention to
disturbances of all sorts; but there is no role in a
specification of the policy commitment for any
mention of targets for variables other than the instru-
ment of policy itself (i.e., for anything besides a
state-contingent operating target for the overnight
interest rate).
The type of rule actually followed, at least in
principle, by central banks like the Bank of England
is a policy rule of a different sort. Svensson (1999,
2003a) defines a targeting rule as a commitment to
adjust the bank’s policy instrument as necessary to
ensure that at each decision point the economy’s
future evolution is still projected to satisfy a certain
target criterion. For example, in the case of the Bank
of England, the target criterion is that CPI inflation
should be projected to equal 2 percent per annum
at a horizon eight quarters in the future.6 This is a
“higher-level” specification of a policy rule than the
kind generally considered in the two literatures just
referred to, since it leaves unspecified precisely what
policy actions will be required in any given circum-
stance to conform to the rule. Implementation of
the policy is only possible using a model of the
economy (likely to be supplemented, in practice,
by judgmental adjustments on the part of the mone-
tary policy committee [MPC]), with which projec-
tions of the economy’s evolution under alternative
hypothetical policy decisions can be constructed.
Commitment to a decision procedure of this
kind has important advantages over both of the
other two conceptions of a monetary policy rule.7
Achievement of the advantages of policy commit-
ment—in particular, avoidance of the inflationary
bias of discretionary policymaking—does not require
one to give up on stabilization policy. Not only may
policy adjust in response to disturbances, but it may
adjust differently to each of an uncountable number
of different types of disturbances, the nature of
which need not even be specifiable in advance.
This is also true, in principle, under the concep-
tion of a policy rule as a commitment to a pre-
specified state-contingent instrument path. But in
practice one cannot imagine computing such an
instrument rule in advance, and announcing one’s
commitment to it, unless one artificially assumes
that the number of different types of disturbances
that could occur is extremely limited. This is a highly
limiting assumption, given that in order to compute
in advance the optimal dynamic response to a given
shock, it is necessary not simply to specify which
equations of one’s model that it perturbs, but also
to give a detailed quantitative specification of the
dynamics of the shock—exactly how persistent it
is expected to be, how far in advance it can be pre-
dicted, and so on. Shocks of a given type—for exam-
ple, variations in government spending owing to the
outbreak of war—that differ in the degree to which
they are unanticipated or the length of time for
which they are expected to last imply different
optimal adjustments of the policy instrument. Thus
they must be treated as different shocks in a complete
specification of the optimal state-contingent instru-
ment rule.
Of course, one can specify a quantitative model
of the economy with a fairly small number of inde-
7 For further discussion, see Svensson (1999, 2003a), Svensson and
Woodford (forthcoming), Giannoni and Woodford (2002), and
Woodford (2003, Chap. 7).
6 Before December 2003, the target criterion instead required that an
alternative measure of inflation, RPIX inflation, equal 2.5 percent eight
quarters in the future. For discussion of the role of this criterion in
the conduct of monetary policy in the United Kingdom, see Vickers
(1998) and Goodhart (2001).
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pendent shocks (no more than the number of
endogenous variables in the model) and estimate
a joint stochastic process for those shocks using
historical data. This method is often used, for exam-
ple, in specifying the kind of stochastic model that
is used for “stochastic simulation” exercises evaluat-
ing alternative simple policy rules. And it may well
be possible to calculate a complete specification of
the optimal state-contingent instrument path for
such a model. But it would be highly unlikely for a
central bank to be willing to commit itself to follow a
rule simply because it has been shown to be optimal
in such an exercise.
For central bankers always have a great deal of
highly specific information about the kind of distur-
bances that have just occurred, which are always
somewhat different from those that have been faced
at other times. Hence even if it is understood that,
“typically,” disturbances to the level of military pur-
chases have had a coefficient of serial correlation
of 0.9 at the quarterly frequency, there will often be
grounds to suppose that the conflict that is currently
looming is likely to be either more persistent or less
persistent than the “typical” one has been in the
past. And it is unlikely that central bankers will be
willing to commit themselves to stick rigidly to a
rule that is believed to lead to outcomes that would
be optimal in the case of “typical” disturbances, even
in a case in which they are aware of the economy
instead being subjected to “atypical” disturbances.
For a proposed policy rule to be of practical interest,
it must instead be believed that the rule is compatible
with optimal (or at least fairly good) outcomes for
the extremely large number of possible types of
disturbances. Yet if one were to try to write out the
optimal state-contingent instrument path, allow-
ing separate terms for each of the possible (finely
grained) types of disturbances that might actually
be faced, such a description of optimal policy would
be completely unwieldy. 
Giannoni and Woodford (2002) instead show
that if the central bank’s policy commitment is
described in terms of a relation among endogenous
variables that the bank is committed to bring about—
rather than in terms of a mapping from exogenous
states to the instrument setting—it is possible, in a
large class of policy problems, to find a rule that is
robustly optimal, in the sense that the same rule
(with given numerical coefficients) continues to be
optimal regardless of the assumed statistical proper-
ties of the (additive) disturbance terms in the model.
Indeed, the target criterion that the authors derive
characterizes optimal policy even if the disturbance
terms in the model structural equations are actually
composites of an extremely large (not necessarily
finite) number of different types of real disturbances.
This is possible because (as illustrated in the next
section) the optimal target criterion is derived from
certain first-order conditions that characterize an
optimal evolution of the economy, and these first-
order conditions do not involve the additive distur-
bance terms in the structural relations.
A rule of this kind represents a policy commit-
ment that a central bank could reasonably make,
despite its awareness that it will constantly be receiv-
ing quite fine-grained information about current
conditions. For a belief that the target criterion
represents a sound basis for judging whether policy
is on track does not require the central bank to
believe that all shocks are alike, or even that all of
the possible types of disturbances to which it may
have to respond can all be listed in advance. At the
same time, a public commitment to the target crite-
rion tells the public in advance what it should expect
with regard to the outcome to be achieved by policy.
This is actually what the public most needs to be
able to forecast well, and this is the aspect of the
public’s expectations that the central bank needs to
influence, to achieve the benefits that are available
in principle from policy commitment.
2. THE CASE FOR PRICE STABILITY
As noted above, the most important innovation
of the inflation-targeting central banks, in my view,
is the organization of policy deliberations around
the achievement of an explicit target, quite apart
from the type of target that happens to be chosen.
But another distinctive feature of inflation targeting,
of course, is that the target is for some measure of
inflation; while control of inflation has always been
an important concern of central bankers, inflation
targeting has given special, and sometimes exclusive,
emphasis to this goal, and debates about the desir-
ability of inflation targeting are often primarily dis-
cussions of the desirability of such a strong emphasis
on inflation. Here I review what the theory of optimal
monetary policy has to say about this.
First of all, the modern (micro-founded) litera-
ture on the real effects of monetary policy provides
ample justification for the conventional wisdom of
central bankers—that it is better for inflation to be
both low and stable. It has been understood for some
time that expected inflation creates distortions by
increasing the opportunity cost of holding (non-
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interest-earning) money, leading to the inefficient
use of real resources to economize on the use of
money in transactions; this was the basis for the
celebrated analysis of the optimal rate of inflation
(which actually turned out to be mild deflation) by
Friedman (1969).8 However, models that incorporate
some reason for prices to not adjust fully and instan-
taneously to changing market conditions—whether
these involve infrequent price changes or simply
slow updating of the information on which prices
are being set—imply that unanticipated variations
in the inflation rate create real distortions as well,
by causing prices that adjust at different times (or
that are being set on the basis of different informa-
tion sets) to become misaligned with one another.
So price stability has important advantages, in
helping the market mechanism to work more effec-
tively. Still, should this stabilization objective be given
priority over others, such as stabilization of real
economic activity or employment? I shall argue,
below, that it should not be an absolute priority; but
the recent literature on the welfare consequences
of alternative monetary policies finds that there is
less tension between inflation stabilization and
properly defined real stabilization objectives than
the traditional (non-welfare-theoretic) literature on
monetary stabilization policy has often suggested.
It is not a bad first approximation to say that the
goal of monetary policy should be price stability.
2.1 When Full Price Stability Is Optimal
Even when one grants that the economy is
subject to exogenous real disturbances of many
sorts—including various types of “supply shocks,”
i.e., disturbances that shift the “natural rate of out-
put,” the level of output that would occur in an
equilibrium with fully flexible prices—it is possible
for the optimal monetary policy to be one that main-
tains completely stable prices in the face of these
disturbances and instead allows real activity to vary.
In particular, this is true in a wide variety of “sticky
price” or “sticky information” models (under varying
assumptions about how many price-setters revise
their prices or update their information in a given
interval of time), as discussed in Woodford (2003,
Chap. 6), where (i) the equilibrium fluctuations in
the real allocation of resources would be optimal if
only all prices were perfectly flexible and set on
the basis of fully up-to-date information and (ii)
there are only aggregate shocks, so that in a flexible-
price equilibrium all goods would have the same
price. These hypotheses allow for the existence of
a wide range of types of real aggregate disturbances
that should affect the natural rate of output—for
example, exogenous variation in technology, in
preferences regarding labor supply or impatience
to consume, or in government purchases—though
it does not allow for certain kinds of “supply shocks,”
such as variations in the degree of market power in
labor or product markets, or variations in tax rates.
The basic intuition is fairly simple.9 The dead-
weight losses due to relative price distortions can be
completely eliminated, in principle, by stabilizing
the aggregate price level. For the aggregate price
level is stabilized by creating an environment in
which suppliers who choose a new price (under
full information) have no desire at any time to set a
price different from the average of existing prices.
Then (because the average price level never changes),
the price desired by any supplier that reconsiders
its price is always the same, regardless of the number
of future periods for which the price is expected to
remain fixed and regardless of how incomplete the
supplier’s information may be about current market
conditions. All new prices are then always chosen
to equal the average of existing prices, and as a result
the average price never changes. And all goods
prices must eventually equal that same, constant
value, so that inefficient relative-price dispersion
due to price stickiness or information imperfections
will not exist.
Furthermore, in such an environment, the
equilibrium real allocation of resources will be the
same as if all prices were fully flexible and set under
perfect information. For by hypothesis, in that case
suppliers would also all choose a common price
equal to the current price index. Since they are able
to charge this price at all times despite the infre-
quency of their reconsideration of their prices or
the limitations of the information that they can use
in adjusting prices, neither the stickiness of prices
nor that of information has any effect on equilibrium
behavior. Since, by hypothesis, the equilibrium
allocation of resources would be optimal under full
information and full price flexibility, it is optimal
under the monetary policy that fully stabilizes prices.
9 It is presented in the case of a model of staggered pricing by Goodfriend
and King (1997). The fact that a similar conclusion is obtained in the
case of “sticky information” is illustrated by the analysis of Ball,
Mankiw, and Reis (2003).
8 Friedman’s argument remains correct in the case of a wide range of





The conditions under which full price stability
can be shown to be an optimal policy are in some
respects quite general; for example, the conclusion
does not depend on fine details of how many prices
are set a particular time in advance or left unchanged
for a particular length of time. Nonetheless, the con-
ditions assumed above are quite special in other
respects—at least as an exact description of reality—
and it is likely that some degree of deviation from
full price stability is warranted in practice. Some of
the more obvious reasons for this are sketched here.
First of all, complete price stability may not be
feasible. In the argument sketched above, I have
supposed that it is possible to use monetary policy
to maintain an environment in which a supplier with
flexible prices and full information would never wish
to change its price. Often there will exist a state-
contingent path for short-term nominal interest rates
consistent with such an equilibrium; it is shown in
Woodford (2003, Chap. 4) that this requires that the
interest rate track the Wicksellian natural rate of
interest—the real rate of return that would prevail
in an equilibrium with flexible prices and full infor-
mation—which varies in response to real distur-
bances. However, it is possible that at some times
(as a result of exogenous real disturbances of a
particular sort) the natural rate of interest is tem-
porarily negative; if so, there cannot be an equilib-
rium in which the nominal rate of interest is equal
at all times to the natural rate, and hence no equilib-
rium in which inflation is zero at all times. As a result,
a policy will have to be pursued that involves less
volatility of the short nominal interest rate in
response to shocks, and some amount of price stabil-
ity will have to be sacrificed for the sake of this.
Varying nominal interest rates as much as the
natural rate of interest varies may also be desirable
as a result of the “shoe-leather costs” involved in
economizing on money balances. As argued by
Friedman (1969), the size of these distortions is
measured by the level of nominal interest rates, and
they are eliminated only if nominal interest rates
are zero at all times. Taking account of these distor-
tions—from which we have abstracted thus far10—
provides another reason for the equilibrium with
complete price stability, even if feasible, not to be
fully efficient; for as Friedman argues, a zero nominal
interest rate will typically require expected deflation
at a rate of at least a few percent per year.
And taking account of these distortions affects
more than the optimal average rate of inflation. As
with distorting taxes, it is plausible that the dead-
weight loss resulting from a positive opportunity
cost of holding money is a convex function of the
relative price distortion, so that temporary increases
in nominal interest rates are more costly than tem-
porary decreases of the same size are beneficial. In
short, monetary frictions provide a further reason
to reduce the variability of nominal interest rates,
even taking as given their average level. (At the same
time, reducing their average level will require less
variable rates, because of the zero floor.) Insofar as
these costs are important, they too will justify a
departure from complete price stability, in the face
of any real disturbances that cause fluctuations in
the natural rate of interest, to allow greater stability
of nominal interest rates.
Yet while both of the factors just mentioned
justify some departure from complete price stability,
it is not clear that the volatility of inflation should
be very great under an optimal policy, even when
such factors are taken account of. For example,
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) characterize opti-
mal policy for an estimated model of the U.S. econ-
omy, when a constraint that the mean federal funds
rate must remain at least a certain number of stan-
dard deviations (greater than two) above zero is
imposed as a substitute for the zero bound (that still
allows a linear characterization of optimal policy).
Even though the real disturbance processes in their
model imply greater volatility of the natural rate of
interest than many would assume (a standard devia-
tion between 3 and 4 percentage points), they find
that optimal policy involves an average rate of infla-
tion only slightly greater than zero (11 basis points!)
and not much variability of inflation (a standard
deviation only 40 percent as large as the actual vari-
ability of U.S. inflation over their post-1980 sam-
ple period). Interest rates are smoothed considerably
in the optimal policy, relative to what would be
required to fully stabilize inflation, but this does not
require too much variation in inflation, as their esti-
mated model implies a variance trade-off that is quite
flat near the extreme of full inflation stabilization.
10 The hypothesis above that the equilibrium allocation of resources
was efficient under flexible prices required, among other things, that
transactions frictions of this kind be abstracted from. The economies
referred to in the previous section are “cashless,” or at least near-
cashless economies, in which transactions frictions are unimportant.
See Woodford (2003) for details.
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For the same reason, taking account of the dis-
tortions created by high nominal interest rates in a
model with transactions frictions justifies only a
relatively modest degree of inflation variation for
the sake of greater stability of nominal interest rates,
at least if the transactions frictions are calibrated at
an empirically realistic magnitude. Woodford (2003,
Chap. 6) finds that when transactions frictions are
calibrated to match facts about U.S. money demand,
the penalty on nominal interest-rate variations that
can be justified on welfare-theoretic grounds is a
good bit smaller than the one assumed in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997). Hence in the case that the
available trade-off between interest-rate variability
and inflation variability is the one estimated by
Rotemberg and Woodford, the degree of inflation
variability that could be justified on this ground
would be even smaller than in their paper.
Even apart from these grounds for concern with
interest-rate volatility, the class of models for which
full price stability is optimal is a special one in several
respects. One obvious restrictive assumption in the
argument sketched above is that there are assumed
to be no shocks that would require the relative prices
of any goods to vary over time in an efficient equi-
librium (i.e., the shadow prices that would decentral-
ize an optimal allocation of resources involve no
variation in relative prices). If, instead, an efficient
allocation of resources requires relative price
changes, due to asymmetries in the way that different
sticky-price commodities are affected by shocks,
then full stabilization of a symmetric index of prices
is not generally optimal, as shown by Aoki (2001)
and Benigno (forthcoming) in the context of two-
sector models with asymmetric disturbances.
Nonetheless, it may still be possible to define
an asymmetric price index, with the property that
stabilization of this index is optimal, at least a good
approximation to optimal policy, as these authors
show.11 If the model is symmetric except for the
frequency of adjustment of different types of prices,
then the optimal price index to stabilize puts more
weight on the prices of the goods with “stickier”
prices; this provides a theoretical justification for
targeting an appropriately constructed measure of
“core” inflation, rather than a standard consumer
price index. But as long as the price index to be
stabilized is appropriately chosen, complete stabi-
lization of a price index is found (in calibrated
examples) to be nearly optimal.
Similarly, the analysis sketched above assumed
flexibility of wages. While this is a familiar assump-
tion in sticky-price models used for pedagogical
purposes, many empirical models imply that wages
are as sticky as prices, and possibly more so.12 But
real disturbances almost inevitably require real
wage adjustments in order for an efficient allocation
of resources to be decentralized. And if both wages
and prices are sticky, it will then not be possible to
achieve all of the relative prices associated with effi-
ciency simply by stabilizing the price level—specif-
ically, the real wage will frequently be misaligned,
as will be the relative wages of different types of
labor if these are not set in perfect synchronization.
In such circumstances, complete price stability
may not be a good approximation at all to the opti-
mal policy, as Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000)
show. Nonetheless, one can show once again that
stabilization of an appropriately weighted average
of prices and wages may still be a good approxima-
tion to optimal policy; it is even fully optimal in
special cases (Woodford, 2003, Chap. 6). Thus con-
cerns of this kind are not so much reasons not to
pursue price stability as they are reasons why care
in the choice of the index of prices (including wages)
that one seeks to stabilize may be important.
Finally, even when wages are flexible (or there
are efficient labor contracts) and all disturbances
have symmetric effects on all sectors of the econ-
omy, the flexible-price equilibrium level of output
need not be welfare-maximizing. Both market
power and the existence of distorting taxes imply
that in reality, the equilibrium level of economic
activity is likely to be too low on average.13 When
this is true, not only is the flexible-price equilib-
rium level of output different from the (first-best)
optimal level, but except in special cases, real dis-
turbances will not shift these two quantities to
12 See, e.g., Amato and Laubach (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2001), Altig et al. (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002a,b), and
Giannoni and Woodford (forthcoming).
13 This does not occur in the model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
owing to the assumed presence of an output subsidy that offsets the
consequences of the market power of the monopolistically competitive
suppliers of differentiated goods.
11 Benigno (forthcoming) applies this idea to an analysis of optimal stabi-
lization objectives for a monetary union in which different regions are
affected asymmetrically by real disturbances. In this application, the
optimal inflation target for the monetary union does not necessarily put
weights on the national inflation rates that are proportional to the shares
of those country’s products in the union-wide consumption basket.
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quite the same extent (in percentage terms).14 This
means that the gap between the level of output
associated with a policy that maintains stable prices
(which is the same as the flexible-price equilibrium
output, as explained above) and the optimal level
of output will be time-varying. If we write the
aggregate-supply relation as a relation between
inflation and the welfare-relevant “output gap”
(i.e., the gap between the actual and efficient levels
of output), an additional exogenous “cost-push” term
appears. As a consequence, it will not be possible
to simultaneously stabilize inflation and the welfare-
relevant output gap.15
Yet even so, the degree of variability of inflation
under an optimal policy may be quite modest. This
is because the relative weight that should be placed
on the goal of output-gap stabilization, relative to
the weight on inflation stabilization, may not be
large. (This is illustrated in the welfare-based loss
function for the model of Giannoni and Woodford,
forthcoming, presented in the appendix.) There is
a straightforward reason for this. In a variety of opti-
mizing models with sticky prices, it is shown in
Woodford (2003, Chap. 6) that the loss function
that corresponds to a quadratic approximation to
expected utility involves a relative weight on output-
gap stabilization that is proportional to the coefficient
on the output gap in the short-run aggregate-supply
relation. This means that the same underlying
microeconomic factors that lead to a relatively flat
aggregate-supply relation—and thus imply that
fluctuations in nominal aggregate demand have
large effects on output relative to their effects on
prices—also imply that the welfare losses associated
with fluctuations in the level of aggregate real activity
are small relative to the welfare losses that result
from the misalignment of prices that are not adjusted
with perfect synchronization when inflation varies.
It follows that, while the welfare-theoretic loss
functions derived for the estimated models of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Giannoni and
Woodford (forthcoming) involve stabilization goals
other than inflation stabilization, by far the largest
coefficients are those on the inflation stabilization
goal. Given this, optimal policy will still be focused
to an important degree on inflation stabilization.
While the considerations sketched in this section
give one ample reason to consider the consequences
of monetary policy for the evolution of variables
other than inflation, it will nonetheless make sense
to think of the optimal policy rule as a “flexible
inflation targeting rule.”
3. IMPROVING THE PRACTICE OF
INFLATION-FORECAST TARGETING
I turn now to some ways in which an optimal
forecast-targeting procedure for the conduct of
monetary policy, from the perspective of the theoret-
ical literature summarized above, would differ from
inflation-forecast targeting as it is currently practiced
by the central banks that have led the way in develop-
ing this approach to monetary policy. Of course,
the precise details of an optimal procedure depend
on the details of one’s model of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism, and it can hardly be argued
that there is yet a consensus about the correct model
to use for one country, let alone a model that can
be claimed to apply equally to all countries. None-
theless, it seems that one can draw at least a few
broad lessons about the character of optimal policy
rules from the analyses that have been undertaken
thus far, and that these differ enough from current
practice to allow some suggestions for improvement.
3.1 The Target Criterion Should Involve
More Than Inflation
The official target criterion of the Bank of
England—ensuring that projected CPI inflation eight
quarters in the future should always equal 2 percent
per annum—refers only to the projected future
value of a particular measure of U.K. inflation. While
other inflation-targeting central banks are often less
explicit about the precise way in which current
policy decisions are supposed to be determined by
their inflation targets, it is very generally the case
that there is an explicit target only for (some meas-
ure of) inflation and no commitment to take into
account the projected paths of any other variables.
Hence debates about the desirability of inflation
14 King and Wolman (1999) and Khan, King, and Wolman (2002) analyze
a model in which it is optimal to fully stabilize prices in response to
technology shocks, despite the existence of an inefficiently low steady-
state level of output. This result, however, depends on the assumption
of special isoelastic functional forms for both preferences and tech-
nology, and also on the assumption of zero steady-state government
purchases; deviations from any of these assumptions will result in full
price stability no longer being optimal. Also, even under the assumed
specification, other types of real disturbances imply that it will not be
optimal to fully stabilize inflation, as Khan, King, and Wolman show.
See Woodford (2003, Chap. 6) for further discussion.
15 Even when the average level of output is efficient, the flexible-price
level of output and the efficient level may be differently affected by
certain kinds of real disturbances. As noted above, these include vari-
ations in market power or in the level of tax distortions.
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targeting in countries such as the United States often
assume that such an approach to policy would mean
a sole concern with inflation stabilization.
An optimal policy, instead, will not involve com-
plete stabilization of inflation except under fairly
special circumstances, as discussed in the previous
section. In general, an optimal policy will involve
some degree of temporary variation in the inflation
rate in response to real disturbances, for the sake
of greater achievement of other stabilization objec-
tives. The degree to which this matters in practice
will depend on the quantitative specification of one’s
model of the economy; but an identification of
inflation targeting with what Svensson (1999) calls
“strict inflation targeting” makes it too easy for oppo-
nents of inflation targeting to argue that it would
prevent the central bank from responding in appro-
priate ways to changing economic conditions.
It is sometimes argued that a coherent monetary
policy requires “a single objective,” so that stabiliza-
tion objectives in addition to inflation stabilization
should play no role in the conduct of monetary
policy, despite the admitted desirability of these
ends.16 It is true that a simultaneous commitment
to stabilize two different variables using a single
policy instrument will, in general, represent a prom-
ise that cannot possibly be fulfilled. But a commit-
ment to a single target criterion, on the basis of which
the instrument of policy is to be adjusted, does not
require that this criterion involve only a single
variable. The target criterion may well be a linear
combination of projections for several different vari-
ables (just as it may also involve inflation projections
at more than one horizon). In general, an optimal
target criterion will be of this form. For example, in
the case of the Giannoni-Woodford model of the
U.S. monetary transmission mechanism discussed
in the appendix, the optimal target criterion involves
not only projected inflation, but also real-wage and
output-gap projections. A lower projection of real
wage growth or of the (welfare-relevant) output gap
will justify acceptance of a higher projected inflation
rate. Nonetheless, there is a single well-defined
measure at each point in time of whether policy
remains on track.
It is not obvious, of course, that actual inflation-
targeting central banks do not take into account
other stabilization objectives in their policy decisions,
despite their use of an official rhetoric that suggests
a strict inflation target. Commentators such as
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Svensson (1999) argue
that all actual inflation-targeting central banks are
“flexible inflation targeters” that trade off inflation
stabilization against other stabilization objectives.
Furthermore, it is often argued that a particular
advantage of inflation-forecast targeting as a policy
rule is precisely that it allows monetary policy to be
used to reduce the short-run effects of disturbances
on real variables (such as the output gap), while
retaining firmly anchored medium-term inflation
expectations, and hence reducing the degree of infla-
tion variability that is required to achieve a given
degree of stability of the real variables.
I do not doubt that actual inflation-targeting
central banks do take some account of real objec-
tives. For example, the introductory summary of the
Bank of England’s Inflation Report always presents
a chart of the Bank’s current real GDP projection as
well as its inflation projection—and the GDP projec-
tion is always discussed first, even if it is solely the
inflation projection that is cited as showing that
policy is on track. But it would be desirable for central
banks to commit themselves to the pursuit of explicit
target criteria that involve real variables as well as
inflation. For one thing, if the criteria on which
policy is actually based include projections for other
variables, it would increase transparency, facilitating
the public’s ability to correctly anticipate future
policy, to explain policy in this way. In addition,
greater frankness about this aspect of banks’ policy
commitments would help to dispel some of the
resistance to the adoption of inflation targeting in
countries like the United States. In particular, it would
show that adoption of a targeting framework by
the Federal Reserve need not imply any departure
from the Fed’s current legal mandate—which
requires it to pursue full employment as well as
price stability—and hence need not wait for
Congressional authorization.17
3.2 A “Medium Term” Target Is Not
Enough
Many would argue that the reason that inflation-
targeting central banks have only an unqualified,
17 On the issue of whether the adoption of inflation targeting in the
United States would require new legislative authority, see also
Goodfriend (forthcoming).
16 A related view asserts that other goals may be introduced only to the
extent that they do not interfere with achievement of the inflation
target. However, absolute priority of the inflation target would not
seem to leave any room for stabilization of output or other variables,
unless the inflation target is not understood to require stabilization
of inflation to the greatest extent possible. Such formulations are




time-invariant target for inflation—rather than a
target criterion that takes account of output projec-
tions, or other variables, as well—is that the inflation
target represents only a “medium-term” goal that
leaves unspecified the precise transition path by
which the medium-term goal is to be reached. (This
is explicit in the case of the Bank of England’s official
target criterion. Only the rate of inflation eight quar-
ters in the future must equal the time-invariant target
rate; nearer-term inflation projections are allowed to
vary.) The appropriate medium-term inflation target
can be stated in an unqualified, time-invariant form,
it is argued, because there is no substantial trade-off
between the inflation rate and real variables this far
in the future. Other stabilization goals are instead
appropriately taken into account in choosing among
the possible nearer-term transition paths that are
consistent with the medium-term target.
In fact, the sort of optimal target criteria that
can be derived using the method of Giannoni and
Woodford (2002) involve much nearer-term projec-
tions than those that are officially targeted by the
Bank of England or other inflation-targeting central
banks. For example, while the targeting criteria dis-
cussed in the appendix involve weighted averages
of projections for many different future quarters, it
is the projection for one or two quarters in the future
that receives the greatest weight. Thus the optimal
target criteria do not merely describe the state that
one wishes to reattain once the effects of recent
disturbances have worked themselves out; they
also characterize the optimal transition dynamics
following a disturbance.
A simple example may be useful in clarifying
this. Suppose that the prices of individual goods are
re-optimized at random intervals as proposed by
Calvo (1983), but that all prices are fixed a quarter
in advance, so that even those new prices that are
chosen in quarter t take effect only beginning in
quarter t+1. Suppose furthermore that, between the
occasions on which the optimality of a given price is
reconsidered, it is automatically indexed to an aggre-
gate price index (but, again, the aggregate price index
of the quarter before the one in which the price will
apply), as proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2001). In a simple model with fixed capital
and no labor-market frictions, this results in an
aggregate-supply relation of the form18
(3.1) ,
where πt is the quarter-t inflation rate, xt is the
(welfare-relevant) output gap, ut–1 is an exogenous
(mean-zero) random disturbance at date t–1, κ is a
positive coefficient, and β is the discount factor of
the representative household. Exogenous fluctua-
tions in the “cost-push” term ut–1 as a result of vari-
ous real disturbances then create a tension between
the goals of inflation stabilization and output-gap
stabilization.
Under the microeconomic foundations proposed
for the aggregate-supply relation above, the appro-
priate welfare-theoretic stabilization objective cor-
responds to minimization of a loss function of the
form19
(3.2)
where both the optimal output gap x* (positive in
the empirically realistic case) and the positive relative
weight λ depend on model parameters. Because it
is assumed that prices are automatically indexed to
a lagged aggregate price index, inflation creates
distortions in the model only to the extent that the
aggregate inflation rate differs from that in the pre-
vious quarter; hence policy should aim to stabilize
the rate of change of inflation, rather than its absolute
level.20 As we shall see, however, this does not mean
that it is not desirable for the central bank to commit
to a fixed long-run inflation target.
Let us consider now the problem of conducting
policy from some date t0 onward so as to minimize
(3.2), subject to a constraint
(3.3)
This last constraint prevents the policy authority
from choosing a policy at date t0that fails to internal-
ize the effects of policy at t0 (insofar as it could have
been forecasted in the previous quarter) on the
inflation-output trade-off faced in quarter t0–1.
Choosing a policy commitment from date t0 onward
in the absence of any such constraint would result
in selection of a policy that is not time-consistent,
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19 For details of the derivation, see Woodford (2003, Chap. 6).
20 The conclusion that the absolute level of inflation has no consequences
for welfare is extremely special to the simple case considered here,
and surely not realistic, as discussed in Woodford (2003, Chap. 7). For
similar analyses of the form of optimal target criteria when there is
no indexation, or only partial indexation, see Svensson and Woodford
(forthcoming) and Giannoni and Woodford (forthcoming).
18 This is essentially the form of aggregate-supply relation proposed by
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and a simplified version of the aggregate-
supply blocks of the empirical optimizing models of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), Altig et al. (2002), Smets and Wouters
(2002a, 2002b), and Giannoni and Woodford (forthcoming).
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for one would commit to a policy at all later dates
that took account of these effects. If the constraint
π –
t0 is chosen (as a function of the state of the world
in quarter t0) in a “self-consistent” way, the optimiza-
tion problem just posed can be solved by a time-
invariant policy rule. Furthermore, if one reconsiders
the desirability of following the policy rule at any
later date, then (assuming that one’s model of the
economy and policy objectives have not changed
in the meantime) one would continue to find that
the same time-invariant policy rule would continue
to solve the corresponding constrained optimization
problem looking forward from the later date.21
Finally, let us suppose that the component of
aggregate real expenditure that is sensitive to interest
rates is also determined a quarter in advance, so that
the output gap xt cannot be affected by monetary
policy decisions later than quarter t–1.22 It follows
that monetary policy can affect only the evolution
of inflation and the component of the output gap
that is forecastable a quarter in advance, and that the
possible stochastic paths for these variables that can
be achieved by any monetary policy are the set of
processes consistent with relation (3.1) for t ≥ t0+1.
The first-order conditions for the optimization
problem just stated are then of the form
(3.4)
(3.5)
for each t ≥ t0, where ϕt–1 is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with constraint (3.1) for each t>t0, and
ϕt0–1 is a multiplier associated with the constraint
(3.3). These conditions, together with the constraints,
determine the optimal state-contingent evolution
of inflation and the forecastable component of the
output gap; the unforecastable component of the
output gap, of course, is exogenously given.
How should monetary policy be conducted to
ensure that this desired state-contingent evolution
of inflation and output is realized? Applying the
method of Giannoni and Woodford (2002), one can
λκ ϕ Ex x tt t + − () −= 1 0 *
ππ ϕ ϕ tt t t +− −+− = 11 0
eliminate the Lagrange multiplier from equations
(3.4) and (3.5), and show that one must have 
(3.6)
for each t ≥ t0, where φ ;λ/κ>0. This in turn implies
that
(3.7)
for each t ≥ t0, where π* is a constant, the value of
which will depend on the initial constraint π –
t0. For
any value of π*, there exists a self-consistent speci-
fication of the initial constant under which optimal
policy satisfies (3.7) for all t ≥ t0. Thus the optimal
long-run inflation target π* is not determined within
this model.23
Optimal policy, then, must arrange that (3.7)
holds at each date, or equivalently, that
(3.8)
(This alternative form emphasizes that the terms in
the target criterion can be affected only by monetary
policy decisions in quarter t or earlier.) Conversely,
one can show that if policy ensures that (3.8) is satis-
fied at each date t ≥ t0, the unique nonexplosive
rational-expectations equilibrium consistent with
the policy commitment solves the optimization
problem stated above. Hence (3.8) is an optimal
target criterion for the central bank’s policy decision
in quarter t.
In the model sketched above, the central bank
cannot expect to affect whether (3.8) holds in quarter
t through adjustment of the interest rate it in that
quarter, for the predetermination of the interest-
sensitive component of expenditure implies that
unforecastable interest-rate changes have no effect
on aggregate demand. The central bank’s period-t
policy decision should then be a commitment it+1,t
regarding its operating target for the interest rate in
quarter t+1. The value of it+1,t should be chosen so
as to lead the central bank to project that (3.8) is
satisfied, conditional on the state of the economy
in quarter t.24 The expectation that it+1,t will be
chosen in this way in each quarter t ≥ t0, and that the
Ex tt t πφ π ++ + [] = 11 *.
πφ π tt t Ex ++ += 11 *
ππ φ tt t tt t Ex E x ++ − − () +− () = 11 1 0
23 The addition of even small frictions can break the indeterminacy of
the optimal long-run inflation target, as discussed in Woodford (2003,
Chap. 7). In practice, one can be certain that the optimal long-run
inflation target is not far from zero; it could even be slightly below zero.
24 Note that in the model sketched here, both Etπt+1 and Etxt+1 should
be affected by the bank’s choice of it+1,t, assuming that the bank’s
announcement of its target for the following quarter is credible to the
private sector.
21 See Woodford (2003, Chap. 7) for further discussion. A policy that
solves a problem of this form is “optimal from a timeless perspective,”
as discussed in Woodford (1999b).
22 For models of aggregate demand with this property, see Woodford
(2003, Chap. 5). This kind of predetermination of interest-sensitive
aggregate expenditure is a feature of many empirical optimizing
models, such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and Laubach
(2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), Altig et al. (2002),




central bank will then act to ensure that it+1=it+1,t
in the following quarter, will then imply the desired
state-contingent evolution of inflation and output.
The proposed policy rule involves a constant
long-run inflation target, since satisfaction of (3.8)
each quarter implies that one must have
(3.9)
at all times t. And it would surely be desirable for
the central bank to emphasize to the public its
commitment to a policy that implies (3.9), as this
should help to anchor long-run inflation expecta-
tions (which would never be allowed to vary in an
optimal equilibrium). Nonetheless, a commitment
to ensure that (3.9) is satisfied at all times is not
sufficient for optimality; many different sorts of
transitory responses to disturbances would be
equally consistent with it.
Nor is it clear what a central bank is committing
itself to do if it pledges to ensure that (3.9) is satisfied
at all times. Condition (3.9) does not place any restric-
tions on the behavior of interest rates over any finite
horizon; hence it is not clear what one would be
able to monitor about a central bank’s decisions in
order to verify that it is indeed acting in conformity
with its supposed commitment. Condition (3.8),
instead—together with the expectation that (3.8) will
also hold at all future dates—does imply a particular
rational-expectations equilibrium value for Etit+1
and so one could monitor, at least in principle,
whether it+1,t is chosen in accordance with it.
The same is true in the case of a “medium term”
target that refers to a specific future date. Condition
(3.8) implies that
(3.10)
must also hold at all times, for any k ≥ 1, in an optimal
equilibrium. So one might imagine that it would
suffice for the central bank to commit to ensure that
(3.10) holds at all times, where k might be eight
quarters in the future. But if k>1 this condition does
not suffice to determine a unique non-explosive
rational-expectations equilibrium, in the context
of the model set out above. For any commitment of
the form
(3.11)
where ut is an exogenous random variable satisfying
Eu ttk +−= 1 0,
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suffices to determine an equilibrium, for the same
reason that (3.8) does, though the equilibrium will
not be the optimal one (the one determined by (3.8)
except when ut=0 at all times). Yet ensuring that
(3.11) holds at all times is consistent with commit-
ment (3.10); thus all of the different equilibria cor-
responding to different choices of the process {ut}
are equally consistent with a commitment of the
form (3.10). It follows that a commitment to ensure
(3.10) fails to determine a unique equilibrium, and
indeed it fails to uniquely determine the required
interest-rate policy on the part of the central bank.
A well-known argument for the desirability of
a target criterion referring only to inflation two years
in the future is provided by Svensson (1997). In the
simple model used in that paper for illustrative pur-
poses, the optimal target criterion (in the sense of
Giannoni and Woodford, forthcoming) is shown to be
of this form. But this results because in that model,
an interest-rate decision by the central bank has no
effect on inflation until two years later. It is also true
in the case of the model sketched above, in which
inflation can only be affected by monetary policy
decisions in the previous quarter, that the optimal
target criterion involves a forecast of inflation one
quarter in the future; if the assumed delay were
longer, the optimal target criterion would look farther
into the future.
However, empirical models of the monetary
transmission mechanism do not commonly imply
delays of greater than a quarter before monetary
policy is able to affect inflation, even if (because of
various sorts of inertia in the transmission mecha-
nism) the models imply that the effects of distur-
bances on the inflation rate are greatest only after
several quarters. For example, the aggregate-supply
relation (3.1) assumed above has the property that
a demand disturbance (due to monetary policy or
some other source) that raises output above its nat-
ural rate for several quarters will steadily increase
inflation for several quarters, with the full effect
on inflation being observed only after output has
returned to its natural level. Nonetheless, optimal
policy is described by a target criterion (3.8) that
involves only a one-quarter-ahead inflation forecast.
A similar result is obtained in the more complex
model of Giannoni and Woodford (forthcoming),
discussed in the appendix: The optimal target criteria
involve forecasts at many future horizons, but the
weight is greatest on the forecasts for the nearest
horizon at which the variables in question can still
be affected by the current policy decision.
 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Woodford
JULY/AUGUST 2004      31
This should not be surprising; if the target crite-
rion is to completely determine a policy decision
at each date, it must specify what defines an accept-
able outcome at the nearest date that can still be
influenced by policy, and not merely what must hap-
pen later, at dates that can be influenced by later
policy decisions. The preference for “medium term”
target criteria at inflation-targeting central banks
represents a preference for incomplete specifications
of the banks’ policy commitments. This probably
reflects a greater degree of certainty about the desir-
ability of the particular aspect of policy about which
the commitment is being made, and this is under-
standable. One can indeed state with greater confi-
dence that it is desirable for medium-term inflation
expectations to be highly stable (and to suggest a
plausible value for the target π*) than one can argue
for the desirability of a particular criterion such as
(3.8) that should be satisfied by the transition dynam-
ics for inflation following a temporary disturbance.
Nonetheless, it is possible to make an argument
for a particular near-term target criterion such as
(3.8) that is surprisingly robust. For example, it might
be thought better to leave the transition dynamics
following disturbances unspecified on the grounds
that the optimal transition dynamics will look very
different in the case of different types of disturbances.
Yet Giannoni and Woodford (2002) show that it is
possible quite generally to find a target criterion
that applies regardless of the character of (additive)
disturbances, yet which is sufficiently specific to
uniquely determine the transition dynamics in
response to any type of disturbance.
It is sometimes proposed, in discussions of
inflation-forecast targeting, that a suitable form of
central bank commitment that is specific enough
about the desired transition dynamics to determine
an appropriate policy action involves specification
of a medium-term inflation target, together with a
specification of the rate at which policy should seek
to restore inflation to the target level when it deviates
from it. A commitment of this form can be expressed
in terms of a near-term target criterion of the form
(3.12) ,
where 0<µ<1 indicates the rate at which departures
from the target should be eliminated; thus such a
proposal amounts to a near-term target criterion,
and not simply a medium-term inflation target.
However, it is not generally possible to express a
robustly optimal target criterion (in the sense of
Giannoni and Woodford, 2002) in a form like this—
Ett t ππ µ π π + =+ − () 1 **
one that makes no reference to the projected path
of any variable other than inflation. A robustly
optimal criterion such as (3.8) implies a particular
rate of convergence of Etπt+k to π* as k is made
large, but this will differ depending on the recent
history of disturbances; it is only the criterion (3.8),
which involves the output-gap projection as well,
that represents a robust criterion for optimality.
3.3 Constant-Interest-Rate Projections
Are an Inappropriate Basis for Policy
One way that inflation-targeting central banks
resolve the problem that their medium-term infla-
tion target alone does not suffice to determine a
particular current interest-rate decision—at least
according to their official rhetoric—is by asking
what constant interest-rate setting over the forecast
horizon would result in a projection consistent with
the medium-term target criterion and then choosing
a current interest-rate operating target at that level.
For example, the Bank of England’s Inflation Reports
justify current policy by showing that a projection
based on the assumption that the interest rate will
remain at the current level for the next two years
indicates projected RPIX inflation equal to 2.5 per-
cent eight quarters from now.25 This does not, how-
ever, mean that such banks constrain themselves
to actually maintain a constant interest rate for two
years at a time; instead, a new interest-rate setting
is to be chosen each time the projection exercise is
repeated.26 
This “solution” to the problem of the incom-
pleteness of the policy commitment represented
by the medium-term target has the advantage of
being simple to explain to the public—as long as
the public is not sophisticated enough to ask what
it really means—but has a number of unappealing
implications.27 First of all, many optimizing mod-
els of the monetary transmission mechanism have
25 Former MPC member Charles Goodhart (2001) describes himself as
having tried to set interest rates in this way, and says “This was, I
thought, what the exercise was supposed to be” (p. 177). Heikensten
(1999) describes the similar procedure used by the Bank of Sweden.
26 Indeed, Goodhart (2001) lists as an advantage of the constant-interest-
rate projection-based procedure that “no one infers any commitment
from the MPC to abide by that assumption in the future, nor is the
credibility of the MPC damaged when, having made this assumption
in a forecast one month, it decides to change interest rates even in
the next month” (pp. 174-75).
27 Goodhart (2001) reviews what he calls “the prima facie case against”
this approach before offering his defense of it. Other critical discussions
include Leitemo (2003), Svensson (2003b), and Honkapohja and Mitra
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the property first demonstrated by Sargent and
Wallace (1975) for a rational-expectations IS-LM
framework, namely, that the equilibrium path of
the price level (and hence of the inflation rate) is
indeterminate under the assumption of a fixed
nominal interest rate (or indeed, any exogenously
specified interest-rate process).28 If such a model
were to be used for the central bank’s projection
exercise, the staff would be unable to compute pre-
dicted paths for inflation or other variables under
the hypothesis of any constant level of nominal
interest rate, and so unable to assert that one par-
ticular level would imply satisfaction of the target
criterion.29
Alternatively, many backward-looking models
(including optimizing models in which expectations
are assumed to be based on extrapolation from past
time series) have the property discussed by Friedman
(1969), namely, that maintaining a constant nominal
interest rate indefinitely will lead to explosive infla-
tion dynamics, through a Wicksellian “cumulative
process.”30 Goodhart (2001) suggests that the Bank
of England’s model has this latter property and that,
as a result, “the rate of change of most variables
visible at the two-year horizon in the Bank’s forecast
generally (though not invariably) tends to persist, and
on occasion to accelerate, in the third and subse-
quent years” (p. 171). In this case, it is possible to ask
which constant interest rate would imply satisfaction
of the target criterion at a certain finite horizon, but
only at the expense of making it clear that hitting
the target at (say) the eight-quarter horizon does not
also imply expecting to hit it in subsequent quarters.
Hence it cannot be the case that one expects to be
content to maintain the constant-interest-rate policy
indefinitely, even in the absence of any developments
that cannot already be foreseen.31
In fact, there is no reason to suppose that the
constant interest-rate path represents the bank’s
best current estimate of the future path of interest
rates. This is at least implicitly conceded by the
Bank of England in its published discussions of the
accuracy of its projections.32 In these discussions,
the Bank gives exclusive attention to the projections
that it also publishes in the Inflation Report, in which
an interest-rate path is assumed that corresponds
to current market expectations, rather than to the
projections conditional on the constant interest-rate
path, even though the latter ones are given primary
emphasis in the justification of policy. It is evident
that the Bank does not regard the constant interest
rate assumption as the best available forecast of its
behavior. For if it did, it would want to test the accu-
racy of the projections made under that assumption,
rather than under whatever contrary assumptions
might be made by traders in financial markets.
Thus the auxiliary assumption that is used to
allow the forecast-targeting procedure to determine
an interest-rate recommendation has the conse-
quence that the targeting procedure is based on
forecasts that are not actually believed, even in the
Bank itself. Such a procedure has the paradoxical
implication that the central bank may choose a
policy under which it does not truly expect the target
criterion to be satisfied, though it may believe that
it would be under the counterfactual hypothesis of
the constant interest rate.
Such a state of affairs can hardly be defended as
conducive to transparency in the conduct of mone-
tary policy. If policy is genuinely based on constant-
interest-rate conditional projections, then one’s policy
decisions are not aimed at ensuring satisfaction of
the target criterion that is announced to the public;
and the projections published by the central bank
are not accurate forecasts that should better help
the private sector to correctly anticipate the econ-
omy’s evolution. On the other hand, if the central
bank genuinely does expect the target criterion to
be satisfied, then policy is not actually determined
in the way that the official rhetoric implies that it
is; and if the forecasts are unbiased, then they are
not the kind of forecasts that they are officially
described as being.
The kind of forecast-targeting procedure recom-
mended by Svensson and Woodford (forthcoming)
as a way of implementing optimal monetary policy
32 See the Bank of England’s Inflation Reports of August 2001 and
August 2002.
28 See Woodford (2003, Chap. 4) for further discussion.
29 Leitemo (2003) discusses possible interpretations of the constant-
interest-rate projection exercise that would allow it to yield a policy
recommendation even in the case of a forward-looking model of the
transmission mechanism; but these do not eliminate the other unap-
pealing features of such a procedure.
30 See Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Preston (2002) for analyses of forward-
looking models with least-squares learning by the private sector.
31 If one’s model currently implies that inflation will depart significantly
from the target rate at the three-year horizon if interest rates are main-
tained at their current level for that long, then it also implies that one
should expect that a year from now—barring unforeseen develop-
ments—if interest rates have been maintained at their current level,
it will then be forecasted that inflation will depart from the target at
the two-year horizon if interest rates are not changed. Hence one
cannot expect that interest rates should remain at their current level
for an entire year, even in the absence of any “news.”
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is of a different sort. In this procedure, one projects
the economy’s future evolution under alternative
contemplated policy decisions, assuming that in
future decision cycles the central bank will again
act to ensure satisfaction of the target criterion. This
amounts to asking what action is needed to project
that the criterion should be satisfied in the current
period, taking as given that it is expected to be satis-
fied in later periods (as a result of the policy actions
to be taken in those periods). Such a calculation
yields a determinate outcome as long as there is a
determinate rational-expectations equilibrium
implied by the target criterion; this is always the
case if the target criterion is selected according to
the method of Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
Thus policy should be based on a projection
exercise that includes a model of the central bank’s
own future behavior—one that is furthermore con-
sistent with the procedure that it actually follows
in making its policy decisions. This is the kind of
projection exercise used as the basis for policy deci-
sions at some central banks, notably the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, which also publishes some
information about the non-constant interest-rate
path implicit in its projections, along with its pro-
jections for inflation and other variables.
Goodhart (2001) objects that such a procedure
is impractical, on the grounds that it would be much
more difficult for a monetary policy committee to
reach agreement on an entire future path for interest
rates than to decide only about the current interest
rate each time they meet. But the procedure described
by Svensson and Woodford (forthcoming) does not
involve a multidimensional decision problem in
each decision cycle. As with the constant-interest-
rate projection method, one makes a decision for
the current period only, on the basis of projections
of the future that (necessarily) incorporate a hypoth-
esis about future policy; the hypothesis about future
policy is simply a more realistic one than the notion
that interest rates will not change, regardless of how
inflation and output evolve. And there is no greater
need for agreement among the members of the
policy committee about that particular aspect of the
model specification than about the other assump-
tions involved in making projections for the future.
Goodhart (2001) also argues that revealing a
projected non-constant path for interest rates is
problematic, because “any indication that the MPC
is formally indicating a future specific change in
rates...would be taken to indicate some degree of
commitment” (p. 175). This is clearly a delicate issue
regarding the proper explanation and the public’s
subsequent interpretation of the central bank’s
projections. Yet the experience in New Zealand sug-
gests that it is possible to reveal interest-rate projec-
tions to the public without being understood to have
made an advance commitment about the path of
the official cash rate. Moreover, a “fan chart” for the
path of interest rates, like those that the Bank of
England currently publishes for its inflation and
output projections, ought to make it clear that the
bank is not committing itself to a definite path;
rather, the expected evolution will depend on a
variety of contingencies that can at best be assigned
probabilities.
If necessary for the reasons to which Goodhart
(2001) refers, it would be preferable to base policy on
projections conditioned on predicted future policy,
and to publish inflation and output projections of
that sort, without any mention of the interest-rate
path implicit in these projections, than to base policy
on projections conditional upon a model of policy
that one knows to be false. But there are likely to
be advantages to publication of the interest-rate
projections. One of the crucial ways in which central
banks affect the economy is through the effects that
their announcements have on expectations regarding
the future path of short-term interest rates, expec-
tations that then determine longer-term bond yields,
asset prices, and exchange rates, which in turn affect
spending, employment, wage-setting, and price-
setting decisions. The current level of overnight
interest rates is in itself of little importance for most
economic decisions; the real significance of central
bank decisions about the overnight rate is what they
are taken to signal about the likely path of interest
rates months and years into the future. Given the
importance to a central bank of steering expectations
of future interest rates in a desirable way, it would
seem that revealing to the public the expected future
path of rates implied by the bank’s policy commit-
ments should help it to better achieve its goals.
3.4 Advantages of a History-
Dependent Target Criterion
A notable feature of the kind of projection
exercises upon which policy is currently based at
banks like the Bank of England is that they are purely
forward-looking. By this I mean that the decision
made at any time is a function solely of the policy
committee’s judgment about the possible paths
from now on for inflation and other variables (if
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any) relevant to its target criterion; past conditions
are irrelevant except insofar as these have an effect
on what it is possible to achieve from now on. Of
course any projection-based decision procedure
will be forward-looking; but under a procedure like
the Bank of England’s (at least as Goodhart, 2001,
describes it), the past is irrelevant because the target
criterion is a time-invariant function of the projected
future path of the target variable (RPIX inflation).
One might think that forward-looking behavior
of this kind is a necessary feature of optimal policy—
that “bygones should be bygones” for a rigorous
optimizer. But as explained above, this is not correct
in the case of the optimal control of a forward-
looking system. If it were, there would be no flaw
in the reasoning of a purely discretionary policy-
maker. When the private sector is forward-looking,
expectations regarding future policy matter for what
can be achieved at any point in time, and outcomes
can generally be improved through a judicious com-
mitment regarding future policy. This requires, how-
ever, that policy be expected to be conducted at the
later date in a way that is history-dependent—that
is, in a way that depends on the earlier conditions
(at the time at which it was desirable to alter expec-
tations) as well as upon conditions at the time that
the action is taken.
This history-dependence can be incorporated
into a forecast-targeting procedure through the use
of a history-dependent target criterion to evaluate
whether the economy’s projected evolution from
now on should be considered to be consistent with
the bank’s general policy commitments. This means
that the acceptable projections for the target variables
looking forward should depend on recent past con-
ditions.33 This is a further reason why, under an
optimal regime, the short-term target for inflation
will be time-varying, even though there is likely to
be a constant long-run inflation target, around which
the short-term target fluctuates. The way in which
an optimal short-term target criterion is likely to be
history-dependent is illustrated in the discussion
in the appendix (of the optimal target criteria in
the case of the estimated model of Giannoni and
Woodford, forthcoming).
A particularly clear example of the advantages
of a history-dependent target criterion is the situation
currently faced by the Bank of Japan, in which the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates has been
reached and yet deflation continues, so that further
monetary stimulus is desirable. As I have already
mentioned, the main lever by which monetary policy
can still affect the economy under such circum-
stances is by changing expectations regarding the
future conduct of policy: Committing to a more
expansionary policy later than would otherwise have
been pursued. But this requires that policy not be
expected to be conducted later in accordance with
a purely forward-looking target criterion. For exam-
ple, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show that the
expectation that the central bank will remain com-
mitted to the forward-looking pursuit of a low (time-
invariant) inflation target—and hence will adjust
interest rates so as to be consistent with the target
as soon as this can be done without violation of the
zero lower bound — can lead to a disastrous outcome
when real disturbances result in a temporarily neg-
ative natural rate of interest. This analysis suggests
that the problem of the Bank of Japan at present is
not that it is not understood to be committed to a
non-negative inflation target, but that it is expected
to pursue its tacit inflation target in a purely forward-
looking manner, with the implication that the
(unwanted) price declines that occur while the zero
bound constrains policy will never be undone.
A commitment to a time-invariant inflation target
would be more likely to avoid the problem caused
by the zero bound, of course, if the target were set
several percentage points above zero, as advocated
by Summers (1991). But this would result in substan-
tial losses of another sort, those created by chronic
inflation. The optimal policy rule, as Eggertsson and
Woodford show, would instead involve commitment
to a history-dependent target criterion, resulting in
temporary inflation after a period in which the zero
bound constrained policy; in addition, a greater
amount of inflation would occur the longer the zero
bound continued to bind and the greater the cumu-
lative deflation that occurred during that time. A low
inflation rate would again be targeted once a suffi-
cient period of time passed in which the zero bound
33 The optimal target criterion (3.8) in the simple example above might
seem not to confirm this principle, as it involves only forecasts of
πt+1 and xt+1. But in that model, inflation is not technically a “target
variable,” because it is the rate of inflation acceleration, rather than
the absolute rate of inflation, that enters the loss function (3.2). A purely
forward-looking target criterion would then be one that involves only
the projected future paths of the output gap and of inflation acceleration.
The target criterion (3.8) is not of this form, as it implies a commit-
ment to eventually reverse past increases in the inflation rate. We could
alternatively adopt (3.6) as a target criterion, and this would also be
optimal. This criterion involves only the projected acceleration of
inflation in period t+1, not the absolute rate of inflation. However,
the criterion is history-dependent because of its dependence on the
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did not prevent the central bank from hitting its
target. Credible commitment to a history-dependent
policy of this kind would create the desired kind of
expectations while the economy is in the “liquidity
trap”—so that the deflation and output contraction
at that time should remain quite modest—without
requiring chronic inflation during normal times and
creating an “inflation scare” during the period in
which the economy is reflated as it exits from the
trap.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Inflation-forecast targeting, as currently practiced
at central banks such as the Bank of England, repre-
sents an important innovation in decision proce-
dures with regard to monetary policy, one that has
moved the actual practice of leading central banks
closer to the ideal that would be recommended on
the basis of economic theory. The organization of
the decision process around the achievement of an
explicit, quantitative target that is also communicated
to the public, and a commitment to the explanation
of policy decisions to the public in terms that allow
verification of the central bank’s commitment to its
putative target are important improvements upon
prior procedures. They can both help to safeguard
a central bank against the trap of discretionary
policymaking, and help the private sector to more
accurately anticipate future policy, increasing the
effectiveness of policy. The introduction of targeting
rules as a way of specifying policy commitments is
also an important conceptual advance, allowing
commitments to be stated in a way that incorporates
a kind of flexibility that is of considerable practical
value, while being specific about the aspects of
policy that are most critical for anchoring private-
sector expectations.
At the same time, current practice falls short of
the theoretical ideal sketched in this paper in some
notable respects. Perhaps the most important of
these is the exclusive emphasis on “medium term”
targets that leave unspecified the basis on which a
particular nearer-term path toward that target is to
be preferred. At best, this represents a significant
degree of vagueness about the criterion that is
actually used to make policy decisions. It may also
indicate that the choice among alternative near-term
paths for the economy is still made on a discretion-
ary basis that will ensure suboptimal policy even
when decisions are made by an omniscient mone-
tary policy committee with a perfect understanding
of social welfare. The question whether it would be
practical for central banks to commit themselves
to more explicit nearer-term target criteria, of the
form indicated by the theory of optimal monetary
policy rules, should be an important issue for further
study by central bankers and monetary economists
alike.
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AN OPTIMAL TARGETING RULE 
FOR THE MODEL OF GIANNONI AND
WOODFORD (FORTHCOMING)
Here I summarize the quantitative form of the
optimal targeting rule derived by Giannoni and
Woodford (forthcoming) in the context of a small,
empirical optimizing model of the U.S. monetary
transmission mechanism. The desirability of this
precise rule depends, of course, on the details of
the quantitative model, many of which are highly
debatable. Nonetheless, it may be useful to consider
this example of an optimal policy rule for an esti-
mated model, as an illustration of some of the general
points made in the text about the likely character of
an optimal policy rule.
The model of Giannoni and Woodford incorpo-
rates both wage and price stickiness, with random
intervals between the times at which both individual
wages and prices are reconsidered, as in the theoreti-
cal analysis of Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000).
In addition, both wages and prices are allowed to
be indexed to the previous quarter’s index of
prices between the occasions on which they are re-
optimized, as proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2001). The degrees of indexation of both
wages and prices are treated as free parameters to
be estimated, as in Smets and Wouters (2002a,
2002b), but our parameter estimates indicate the
best fit under the assumption of full indexation of
both wages and prices, as assumed by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans. Both wages and prices are
also determined a quarter in advance. On the
demand side of the model, the preferences of the
representative household are assumed to allow for
habit persistence, and the best fit is obtained when
the habit-persistence coefficient takes the largest
allowable value, so that utility depends on the change
in real expenditure rather than its level. In addition,
real private expenditure is determined two quarters
in advance. The several free parameters of the model
are estimated by minimizing the distance between
the predicted impulse responses of four variables
(output, inflation, the real wage, and the short-term
nominal interest rate) to a monetary policy shock
and those implied by an unrestricted VAR model of
the same four time series. The parameter estimates
are consistent with the sign restrictions implied by
theory, and several restricted versions of the model—
a restricted model with no indexation to the lagged
price index, a restricted model with flexible wages,
and a restricted model with no habit persistence—
can each be statistically rejected.
Here I summarize the implications for optimal
policy of treating the best-fitting parameter values
as representing the literal truth. First of all, the esti-
mated model implies that maximization of the
expected utility of the representative household
corresponds to minimization of a quadratic loss
function of the form
(A.1)
,
where πtis an index of goods price inflation between
quarter t–1 and quarter t, πt
w is an index of wage
inflation, and xt is the output gap (log real output
relative to a “natural rate of output” that varies in
response to several types of real disturbances). The
discount factor is calibrated to equal 0.99 (to imply
a realistic long-run average real rate of return), while
the model’s estimated parameters imply the values
λp=0.9960, λw=0.0040, λx=0.0026, and δ=0.035
for the coefficients of the loss function.
The fact that prices are indexed to a lagged price
index implies that it is inflation acceleration, rather
than the rate of inflation as such, that creates distor-
tions, as in the simpler model discussed in the text.
The fact that wages are also sticky implies that wage
inflation also creates distortions, even when the rate
of goods price inflation is stable; because wages
are indexed to the lagged price index, it is actually
wage inflation relative to lagged price inflation that
measures this distortion. Finally, because of habit
persistence, the distortions associated with fluctua-
tions in the output gap are not proportional simply
to a sum of squared deviations of the output gap each
period from its optimal level, but rather to a sum of
squared deviations of the output gap from an increas-
ing function of the previous quarter’s output gap.
However, the weight δon the lagged output gap turns
out to be quite small, despite the existence of sub-
stantial habit persistence.
We also find that the estimated parameter values
imply a very small relative weight on the wage-
inflation stabilization objective relative to the price-
inflation stabilization objective. This is not because





































AppendixFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Woodford
JULY/AUGUST 2004      39
estimated parameters imply larger distortions
resulting from misalignment of prices than from
misalignment of wages. The relative weight on the
output-gap stabilization objective implied by the
parameter estimates is also quite small; this follows
directly from the estimation of parameters that imply
only weak responses of wage and price inflation to
variations in the output gap, as discussed in the text.
An optimal policy for the estimated model—
and one with the desirable property that it is optimal
regardless of the assumed statistical properties of the
disturbances, and not solely in the case of distur-
bance processes of the kind implied by the estimated
model for the historical sample period—can be
implemented by a targeting procedure of the follow-
ing kind.34 First, in each quarter t, the central bank
intervenes in the money markets (through open
market operations, repurchases, standing facilities
in the interbank market for central bank balances,
etc.) so as to implement the interest rate target it,t–1
announced in quarter t–1. As in the simpler model
discussed in the text, the fact that wages, prices, and
spending are all predetermined for a quarter implies
that nothing can be gained from allowing variations
in interest rates that are not forecastable in the pre-
vious quarter.
Second, in the quarter-t decision cycle, the bank
must choose an operating target it+1,t to announce
for the following quarter. This is chosen in order to
imply a projected evolution of (wage and price)
inflation from quarter t+1 onward that satisfies a
target criterion of the form
(A.2) ,
where π –
t is a target value that has been determined
in quarter t–1. Here for each of the variables z=π,w,
the expression Ft(z) refers to a weighted average of
forecasts of the variable z at various future horizons,
conditional on information at date t:
(A.3) ,
where the weights αk
z sum to 1. Thus the coefficient
φw is actually the sum of the weights on real-wage
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forecasts at different horizons, k. We observe that
the target criterion can be thought of as a wage-
adjusted inflation target. 
Third, it is also necessary, as part of the quarter-t
decision cycle, for the central bank to choose the
target π –
t+1 for the following quarter. This is chosen
so as to ensure that future policy will be conducted
in a way that allows the bank to project (conditional
on its current information) that another target crite-
rion, of the form
(A.4) ,
should be satisfied, where the expressions Ft *(z) are
again weighted averages of forecasts at different
horizons (but with relative weights αk
z* that may be
different in this case) and πt *is another time-varying
target value, once again a predetermined variable.
In this case the criterion specifies a target for a wage-
and output-adjusted inflation projection.
In this last procedure, optimality requires that




where the expressions Ft
1(z) are still other weighted
averages of forecasts at different horizons, with rela-
tive weights αk
z1 that again sum to 1, and π* is an
arbitrary constant.35 Note that the optimal target
value depends on the previous quarter’s forecasts
of the economy’s subsequent evolution; this is an
example of the history dependence of optimal target
criteria, discussed generally in the text.
The estimated parameter values imply the fol-
lowing numerical coefficients in the optimal target
criteria. In the case of the short-term criterion (A.2),
the coefficient φw is equal to 0.565.36 Thus if unex-
pected developments in quarter t are projected to
imply a higher future level of real wages than had
previously been anticipated, policy must ensure that
projected future price inflation is correspondingly
reduced. This is because of a desire to stabilize
(nominal) wage inflation as well as price inflation,
πθ π θ π θ θ ππ t t xt xt FF w F x
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35 Note that in the model considered here, as in the simpler model dis-
cussed in the text, there is no welfare significance to any absolute
inflation rate, only to changes in the rate of inflation and to wage
growth relative to prices. There is therefore no particular inflation
rate that could be justified as optimal from a timeless perspective.
36 Here and below, the coefficients are presented for a target criterion
where the inflation rate is measured in annualized percentage points.
34 Because the empirical model is quarterly, it is simplest to discuss the
policy process as if a policy decision is also made once per quarter,
even though in reality most central banks reconsider their operating
targets for overnight interest rates somewhat more frequently than
this. The discussion should not be taken to imply that it is optimal
for the policy committee to meet only once per quarter; this would




and under circumstances of expected real wage
growth, inflation must be curbed in order for nomi-
nal wage growth to not be even higher.
The relative weights that this criterion places
on projections at different future horizons are shown
in Figure A1. The two panels plot the coefficients
αk
π and αk
w as functions of the horizon k. Note that
in each case the quarter for which the projections
receive greatest weight is one quarter in the future.
This is also the first quarter in which it is possible for
wage or price inflation to be affected by the choice
of it+1,t, according to the estimated model. However,
while the real-wage projection that matters is pri-
marily the projected growth in real wages between
the present quarter and the next one, substantial
weight is also placed on projected inflation farther
in the future; in fact, the mean lead Σkαk
πk is between
10 and 11 quarters in the future in the case of the
inflation projection Ft(π). Thus the short-run target
criterion is a (time-varying) target for the average rate
of inflation that is projected over the next several
years, adjusted to take account of expected wage
growth, mainly over the coming quarter. Roughly
speaking, optimal policy requires the central bank
to choose Etit+1 in quarter t to head off any change
in the projected average inflation rate over the next
several years that is due to any developments not
anticipated in quarter t–1 (and hence reflected in
the current target π –
t–1). This is a criterion in the spirit
of inflation-forecast targeting as currently practiced
at central banks such as the Bank of England, except
that projected wage growth matters as well as price
inflation, and that the target shifts over time.
In the case of the long-term criterion (A.4),
instead, the numerical coefficients of the target
criterion are given by 
.
In this case, output-gap projections matter as
well; a higher projected future output gap will require
a reduction in the projected future rate of inflation,
just as will a higher projected future real wage. The
numerical size of the weight placed on the output-
gap projection may appear modest; but as we shall
see below, the degree of variability of output-gap
projections in practice is likely to make this a quite
significant correction to the path of the target 
criterion.
The relative weights on forecasts at different
horizons in this criterion are plotted in the panels
in the first row of Figure A2. We observe that in the
case of this criterion, the projections that mainly
matter are those for two quarters in the future; the
criterion is nearly independent of projections regard-
ing the quarter after the current one. Hence it makes
sense to think of this criterion as the one that should
determine the central bank’s intended policy two
or more quarters in the future (and hence its choice
in quarter t of the target π –
t+1 to constrain its choice
in the following period of it+2,t+1); but this criterion
should not be thought of as a primary determinant
of whether the bank’s intended policy in period t+1
is on track. The projections that receive the greatest
weight under this criterion are those for the same
quarter (quarter t+2) that will receive the greatest
weight in the targeting procedure for which π –
t+1
provides the target value.
Finally, the coefficients of the rule (A.5) deter-
mining the target value for the long-term criterion
are given by
.
The weights in the projections (conditional on
information in the previous quarter) at various
horizons are plotted in the second row of Figure A2.
Here, too, it is primarily projections for two quarters
in the future that matter in each case. Roughly speak-
ing, then, the target value for the wage- and output-
θθθ π
*** ... = == 0 580 0 252 0 125 , , wx
φφ wx
** .. == 0 258 0 135 ,




















NOTE: Relative weights on projections at different horizons in
the short-run target criterion (A.2). The horizontal axis indicates
the horizon k in quarters.
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adjusted inflation projection two quarters in the
future is high when a similar adjusted inflation
projection (again, for a time two quarters in the
future) was high in the previous quarter.
Thus forecasting exercises, in which the central
bank projects the evolution of both inflation and
real variables many years into the future under alter-
native hypothetical policies on its own part, play a
central role in a natural approach to the implementa-
tion of optimal policy. A forecast of inflation several
years into the future is required in each (quarterly)
decision cycle in order to check whether the intended
interest-rate operating target for the following quarter
is consistent with the criterion (A.2). In addition, the
time-varying medium-term inflation target π –
t must
be chosen each period on the basis of yet another
forecasting exercise. While the long-run target crite-
rion (A.4) primarily involves projections for a time
only two quarters in the future, the choice of π –
t+1
requires that the central bank solve for a projected
path of the economy in which (A.4) is satisfied not
only in the current period, but in all future periods
as well. Hence this exercise as well requires the con-
struction of projected paths for inflation and real
variables extending many years into the future. The
relevant paths, however, will not be constant-interest-
rate projections, but rather projections of the econ-
omy’s future evolution given how policy is expected
to evolve. Indeed, the projections are used to select
constraints upon the bank’s own actions in future
decision cycles, by choosing both the interest-rate
operating target it+1,t and the adjusted inflation target
π –









































































NOTE: Relative weights on projections at different horizons in the long-run target criterion. Panels in
the first row indicate the projections in (A.4), while the second row indicates the projections from the
previous quarter that define the target value     . π*
t
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